Consider the Source: A Note on Public-Sector Union Expenditure Restrictions Upheld in Davenport v. Washington Education Association by Himebaugh, Daniel A.
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 28 | Issue 2 Article 5
10-15-2008
Consider the Source: A Note on Public-Sector
Union Expenditure Restrictions Upheld in
Davenport v. Washington Education Association
Daniel A. Himebaugh
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Election Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Labor and
Employment Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel A. Himebaugh, Consider the Source: A Note on Public-Sector Union Expenditure Restrictions Upheld in Davenport v. Washington
Education Association, 28 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary Iss. 2 (2008)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol28/iss2/5
Consider the Source: A Note on Public-Sector Union
Expenditure Restrictions Upheld in Davenport v.
Washington Education Association
By Daniel A. Himebaugh*
I. INTRODUCTION
In some states there is private taxation, where a private
organization is authorized by the state to compulsorily collect money
from certain people for the organization's own use. The "agency-fee
system," by which public-sector employee unions collect "dues"
from nonmembers as a condition of government employment, is a
manifestation of private taxation. It is still the way of doing business
in Washington State.'
In 1850, the classical liberal philosopher Frederic Bastiat
envisioned such a system, calling it "legal plunder:"
Sometimes the law defends plunder and participates in
it .... See if the law takes from some persons what
belongs to them, and gives it to other persons to whom
it does not belong. See if the law benefits one citizen
at the expense of another by doing what the citizen
cannot do himself without committing a crime ...
The person who profits from this law will complain
bitterly, defending his acquired rights. . . . Do not
listen to this sophistry by vested interests. The
• Daniel A. Himebaugh is a J.D. candidate at Pepperdine University School of
Law.
1. See WASH. REv. CODE § 41.59.100 (2007). All references to Washington
hereafter, refer to the State of Washington.
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acceptance of these arguments will build legal plunder
into a whole system.2
The Supreme Court of the United States found a grain of merit in
Bastiat's characterization. In the opinion of Justice Scalia, public-
sector employee unions (private entities) are not constitutionally
entitled to spend the agency fees they collect on just anything. 3
Those fees are "other people's money." 4
Davenport v. Washington Education Association decided whether
a state law prohibiting the Washington Education Association (the
WEA) from spending nonmember agency fees on election-related
purposes without affirmative consent of the nonmembers violated the
First Amendment.5 A unanimous Court held it did not.6 This case
note, divided into six main sections, explains the Court's holding.
Immediately following this introduction is the background, including
the allocation of regulatory authority between the federal National
Labor Relations Board and state governments; a more thorough
treatment of the law's view of agency-fee systems; and a look at the
core, but somewhat latent, First Amendment issue here--campaign
finance.7 The case facts are then summarized,8 and an analysis of the
opinion is presented. 9 Finally, the impact of the case is discussed,' °
and concluding thoughts are offered."
2. FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 16-18 (Foundation for Economic Education,
1998) (1850).
3. See Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2007).
4. Id.
5. See id. at 2376.
6. See id. at 2383.
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See discussion infra Part III.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.
10. See discussion infra Part V.
11. See discussion infra Part VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Labor Relations-Federal and State Responsibilities
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (the
NLRA), which created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
to regulate problems brought about by labor strife.' 2  Originally
justified on interstate commerce grounds, the NLRA sought to
"promote the full flow of commerce,"'1 3 and prescribe rights to
employees and employers in labor relations nationwide. 14
The Act cast a wide net over American employers, but significant
exemptions impacted the decision in Davenport. Specifically,
subsection 2 of section 152 of the NLRA, the section that defines the
scope of the Act, excludes states and their political subdivisions from
regulation.' 5 Therefore, Washington State, acting in its capacity as
the employer of public schoolteachers (through the political
subdivision of school districts), is saved from NLRB direct oversight
and left to regulate its own labor relations.' 6 Since state law governs
in this arena, under Washington State law, public-sector employee
unions, such as the WEA, may become exclusive collective-
bargaining agents for state-employed teachers.V
12. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 153 (2007). The NLRA was amended in 1947 to
promote a more mutual approach, focusing on the interests of both employees and
employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2007).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2007).
14. Id.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2007); see James C. Howe, Collective Bargaining-
Faculty Status Under the National Labor Relations Act-NLRB v. Yeshiva
University, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979), 54
WASH. L. REV. 843, 844-45 n.13 (1979) (explaining that the NLRA only applies to
those individuals who fall within the statutory definition of "employee," and
specifying that the NLRA's protections are limited to employees working for non-
government employers).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
17. See generally Educational Employment Relations Act, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 41.59.010-950 (2007) (outlining Washington State law on education employee
relations and awarding exclusive collective-bargaining rights to employee
organizations where the state board certifies the representation).
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B. The Agency-Fee System-Supreme Court Precedent
State regulations vary accordingly, but Washington's Revised
Code endorses an agency-fee system, the very scheme at the center of
the Davenport controversy. 18 Given that it possesses the authority to
vest agency-fee collection power to private-entity unions,
Washington State does so under the theory that agency-fee systems
prevent free-riding.' 9  The logic underlying this theory is that
because an exclusive agent (here the WEA) represents public
employees (the teachers) in a collective-bargaining capacity,
employees who choose not to be members of the union must pay an
agency fee the equivalent of union dues for the collective-bargaining
protection available to them through the union's efforts. 20  It is
considered a safeguard for the unions. 2
1
Teachers, who are employed by the state, are represented in labor
negotiations by a union even if they object to being union members.
The agency-fee system covers nonmembers by compelling them to
pay an equivalent due (agency fee) to the union as a condition of
their employment as public schoolteachers. 22  This involuntary
charge on nonmembers necessitates protection of teachers who are
forced to pay money to a union, in which they want no part, from
union expenditures to which they object. Protection was established
by the Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,23 which
curtailed unions' ability to spend agency fees for ideological
purposes over the objections of nonmembers. 24 Abood held that
18. See WASH. REv. CODE § 41.59.100.
19. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2376-77.
20. See id.; see, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 511 (1991)
(providing an additional source of law for the Court that recognized the validity of
public-sector employee union agency-fee systems in state law).
21. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377 (citing Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760-64 (1961)). "The primary purpose of such arrangements
is to prevent nonmembers from free-riding on the union's efforts, sharing the
employment benefits obtained by the union's collective bargaining without sharing
the costs incurred." Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377.
22. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.59.100.
23. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
24. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36 (holding that "the Constitution requires
only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by
nonmembers could permissibly object to the ideological and political
purposes for which their fees were spent.25 A "constitutional
floor,",26 or minimum requirement, for procedural enforcement of the
Abood rule against unions was adopted in Teachers v. Hudson.27 In
accordance with Hudson, the WEA sent "Hudson packets" 28 to
nonmembers affording them the opportunity to object to union
political expenditure of agency fees and instructing them on rebate
options.
Unlike cases before it, Davenport determined whether a state law
could require that unions obtain "affirmative consent" of agency-fee-
paying nonmembers before spending the money for political
purposes, instead of requiring the nonmembers to respond in
opposition within a given time period 9.2  The operative difference is
that affirmative consent stops unions from spending the money
before obtaining permission, rather than allowing unions to spend the
money if nonmembers fail to object. However immaterial the
distinction might appear on first impression, the union argued that it
held a constitutional and property interest in the agency fees, which
the affirmative-consent requirement impinged. That belief stemmed,
in part, from the underlying campaign finance issue.
employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced
into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental employment").
25. See id.
26. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
27. Chi. Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (setting
forth procedures unions must use to assure nonmembers are empowered to prevent
unions from spending the agency fees impermissibly). The minimums set forth in
Hudson were: (1) "an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee;" (2) "a
reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an
impartial decisionmaker;" and (3) "an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute
while such challenges are pending." Id. at 310.
28. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377-78.
29. Id. at 2377; see WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.760. "A labor organization may
not use agency shop fees paid by an individual who is not a member of the
organization to make contributions or expenditures to influence an election or
operate a political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individual."
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.760(1) (2007).
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C. Campaign Finance-Money as Political Speech
There is a liberal dose of skepticism prevalent in many
discussions of campaign finance, especially regarding a First
Amendment speech protection of contributions and expenditures that
in recent decades has instigated a national reform effort.3' Take, for
example, Elizabeth Drew in her book The Corruption of American
Politics:
The First Amendment is a mobile missile . . . To
politicians the First Amendment means ensuring that
they have the financial resources to do what they need
to do" . . . . "The First Amendment is a great issue:
People may think politics is corrupt, but do you want
your rights taken away? There's something unique
about using the word 'rights' to Americans that rallies
them. I think the opponents [to reform] believe it
now-that First Amendment rights are threatened.
They've said it so many times that it's in their belief
system, but what it's really about is power."31
Cynical as Drew's outlook may be, it is not the legal philosophy on
the issue.
The Federal Election Campaign Act was amended in 1974 to
expand the scope of campaign finance regulation, including the
30. See 2 RALPH A. RossuM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS
151 (6th ed. 2003).
In 2002, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act,
its most far-reaching regulation of election practices since the 1974 statute
that led to Buckley v. Valeo. The 2002 law limits the contributions that
corporations, labor unions, and individuals can make to political parties,
often referred to as "soft money contributions" because they are not made
to an identifiable candidate. The law also prohibits corporations, trade
associations, and unions from financing "electioneering" ads pertaining to
candidates for federal office during the last sixty days before a general
election and the last thirty days before a primary election.
Id.
31. ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 56-57 (2000)
(quoting an anonymous "prominent business lobbyist").
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creation of the Federal Election Commission as the enforcement and
regulatory agency administering the provisions of federal election
law. 32 Along with establishing the FEC, the Act produced four main
components that constituted a regulatory scheme for federal
elections: (1) limit the size of contributions made to political
campaigns by individuals and groups; (2) limit the amount candidates
spend in their own campaigns; (3) require disclosure of contributions
and expenditures; and (4) provide a program of public financing for
presidential campaigns. 33
A lawsuit challenged the Act on First Amendment grounds in the
important 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo.34 In that case, the Court
evaluated two competing issues: combating corruption in the federal
election process and impinging on the free-speech rights guaranteed
by the Constitution.
The lengthy decision split the law in light of constitutional
tensions, upholding some provisions and invalidating others:
In [Buckley v. Valeo] ... the Court upheld the [A]ct's
disclosure requirements and its limits on campaign
contributions, maintaining that they served an
important purpose (elimination of corruption) and
impinged only minimally on speech. But the justices
invalidated the limits on campaign expenditures,
concluding that such restrictions limited the
communication of political views without contributing
significantly to the control of corruption. 3
5
Thus, both sides won and lost, with the Court deciding that a
restriction on speech had limits even if the law served a meritorious
purpose central to the maintenance of constitutional government.36
Especially of concern were private expenditures by candidates on
their own campaigns, which "[raise] First Amendment problems
because restricting the use of money for speech purposes is a speech
32. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c (2007).
33. See RossuM & TARR, supra note 30, at 150.
34. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
35. RosSuM & TARR, supra note 30, at 150.
36. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
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restriction." 37 However, the importance of Buckley for purposes of
Davenport is that the Court recognized the spending of money for
political purposes as an exercise of speech rights under the First
Amendment, an interpretation upon which the WEA certainly relied.
With the law prior to Davenport recognizing a speech issue in the
spending of money for political purposes, and the necessity of
protecting union nonmembers from being compelled to contribute
money to purposes they do not actively support, the relative rights of
the parties had to be resolved vis-A-vis the Washington law that gave
union nonmembers affirmative-consent power over the unions'
expenditure of agency fees. At issue: Where is the First Amendment
crossed, and whose money is it anyway?
III. FACTS
A. At Issue
Justice Scalia concisely described the issue before the Court in
Davenport: "The State of Washington prohibits labor unions from
using the agency-shop fees of a nonmember for election-related
purposes unless the nonmember affirmatively consents. We decide
whether this restriction, as applied to public-sector labor unions,
violates the First Amendment. 38
B. Setting the Stage
In Washington, public-sector employee unions operate in an
agency-fee system built by state statute. 39 The system allows unions
to charge public employees who are union nonmembers an agency
fee, taken directly through payroll.4 ° In 1992, the voters of
Washington approved a statewide ballot initiative known as the Fair
Campaign Practices Act.41  The controversial provision of that
legislation, labeled "§ 760" by the Court, restricted unions' ability to
37. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and of the Press, in THE HERITAGE
GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 314 (Meese et al. eds., 2005).
38. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2376.
39. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.59.060, 41.59.100 (2007).
40. See id.
41. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377.
42
use agency fees for political purposes. Section 760 prohibited
unions from spending agency fees to influence an election or operate
a political committee unless the union was affirmatively authorized
to do so by the individual nonmember who paid the agency fee.43
The Davenport respondent, the WEA, represented approximately
70,000 public schoolteachers as an exclusive collective-bargaining
agent in Washington State, including many teachers who were not
members of the union.44 Twice a year the WEA sent a "Hudson
packet ' 45 to all nonmembers. Contained in the packet was a
notification of the individual nonmember's right to object to the
union's use of agency fees for political purposes.4 6 It provided
"three options: (1) pay full agency fees by not objecting within 30
days; (2) object to paying for nonchargeable expenses and receive a
rebate as calculated by [the WEA]; or (3) object to paying for
nonchargeable expenses and receive a rebate as determined by an
arbitrator." 47  Fees were held in escrow until the objection time-
window elapsed. 48  The WEA's method for settling agency-fee
expenditures with nonmembers did not comply with § 760 because
the WEA spent the money for purposes prohibited under § 760 unless
nonmembers objected instead of holding the money to wait for
affirmative authorization as the law required.49
C. State Lawsuits
Two lawsuits were filed against the WEA in 2001, one by
Washington State and the other by a class of union nonmembers
alleging that the WEA had violated § 760 by not obtaining
affirmative consent from nonmembers before spending agency fees
for election-related purposes. 50 After extensive litigation, the case
42. Id.
43. See WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.760.
44. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377.
45. See supra note 27.
46. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377.
47. See id at 2377-78.
48. See id. Nonmembers were allowed thirty days to respond in objection. See
id. Silence did not count as an objection. See id.
49. See WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.760.
50. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378.
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reached the Supreme Court of Washington where it was decided that
the WEA had indeed failed to follow the provisions of § 760."' But
the Washington court ruled that § 760 was unconstitutional with
respect to the U.S. Constitution because the affirmative-consent
requirement violated the First Amendment relative to a balance of
associational and speech rights that allowed the union to spend
agency fees for political purposes, uninhibited by the strict
requirements of § 760.52
The Supreme Court of Washington read the Supreme Court of the
United States' previous decisions on the issue of agency fees to
require a certain relationship between the interest of unions and the
interest of nonmembers that the strictures of § 760 had violated.
Justice Scalia explained:
The court reasoned that this Court's agency-fee
jurisprudence established a balance between the First
Amendment rights of unions and of nonmembers, and
that § 760 triggered heightened First Amendment
scrutiny because it deviated from that balance by
imposing on [the WEA] the burden of confirming that
a nonmember does not object to the expenditure of his
agency fees for electoral purposes. 5
3
The WEA had in fact violated § 760 by not obtaining affirmative
consent before spending agency fees on election-related purposes,
but whether that statute would be invalidated because it required
more of the union than the First Amendment would bear was a
question for the Supreme Court of the United States. The decision
was appealed from the Supreme Court of Washington in a
51. See id.; see also State ex rel. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v.
Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 130 P.3d 352, 357 (Wash. 2006).
52. See Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 130 P.3d at 357-65; see also
Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378. The Supreme Court of Washington ruled that § 760
did not stand up to strict scrutiny for speech rights, and that it "interfered with
respondent's expressive associational rights." Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378. The
court below cited Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding
that a state public accommodation law requiring the Boy Scouts to accept
homosexual scoutmasters into their organization violated the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment right of expressive association). Id.
53. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378.
consolidation of the two cases brought in the state.54 The Court
granted certiorari.55
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Section 760-A Condition on an Extraordinary Power
The Court presented its reasons for holding that § 760 did not
violate the First Amendment with a bifurcated analysis.5 6 Part II-A,
supported by a unanimous court, explained how the Supreme Court
of Washington misread the Court's agency-fee precedent.5 7 Part II-
B, joined by all except Justices Alito, Breyer, and Chief Justice
Roberts, 58 explored the Court's rationale more deeply, including a
dismissal of the WEA's "encumbrance theory;"5 9 a review of
content-based First Amendment restrictions; and a clarification of the
limitations of the holding. 60  Central to the analysis, however, is a
short introductory paragraph to Part 11.61
Justice Scalia, penning the majority opinion, wrote openly about
the extraordinary nature of the agency-fee system. 62 His description
of the "undeniably unusual, 63 program informed the bulk of the
opinion. In the Court's mind, the agency fees in Davenport were
essentially taxes paid by government employees to a private entity.64
Though the WEA argued for the recognition of its legal right to
54. See 127 S. Ct. 35 (2007) (granting certiorari).
55. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (providing the Court with subject
matter jurisdiction to hear cases appealed from the highest state court when the
constitutionality of a state statute is in question).
56. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378-83. Part I-A's unanimous opinion
corrected the mistaken reading of agency-fee precedent. See id. Part I-B, supported
by six justices, dismissed the WEA's encumbrance and content-based
discrimination theories, and applied limitations to the Court's holding. See id.
57. See id. at 2379.
58. See id. at 2383. The three justices wrote a brief concurrence. See id.
59. See id. at 2380.
60. See id. at 2380-83.
61. See id. at 2378.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
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collect the fees, the Court could not clear the hurdle of explaining
why the election-related expenditure of money extracted from people
who were not part of the union was of such high First Amendment
importance to the WEA.
Instead, the Court characterized § 760 as a "condition on the
union's exercise of [an] extraordinary power." 65 The condition, of
course, was the affirmative-consent requirement of § 760, which
protected nonmembers from unapproved union expenditures by
requiring the union to acquire nonmember permission to spend
agency fees for political purposes. "The notion that this modest
limitation upon an extraordinary benefit violates the First
Amendment is, to say the least, counterintuitive, ' 66 wrote Justice
Scalia. The Court, therefore, dispatched with the WEA's argument
that the union possessed a constitutional right67 to spend nonmember
agency fees without complying with § 760 and turned the Supreme
Court of Washington's opinion on its head.
It mattered to the Court that the WEA enjoyed what appeared to
be a sweetheart deal with the state legislature that allowed them to
collect fees from schoolteachers who wanted no stake in the union.
68
Such a power had limits, and § 760 represented a minimally
restrictive variation of those limits. 69  The Court noted, and the
respondent conceded, that the voters of Washington could have seen
fit to reduce agency-fee expenditure capabilities to the portion of
those fees strictly required by the union for collective-bargaining
activities, or even eliminate the agency-fee system completely. 70 It
followed that § 760 posed "no greater constitutional concern" 71 as a
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 2379. The union's lack of constitutional entitlement was further
expanded in Part 1I-B where the Court addressed the encumbrance theory promoted
by the WEA to impugn § 760. See id. at 2380.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 2378.
70. See id.; see, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129 v. Nw. Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (upholding the constitutionality of state laws that
prohibited employers from denying an employee an opportunity to work because
they were not a member of a labor union and forbidding such contracts to be made
between employers and unions).
71. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
restriction of a lesser degree than other far-reaching and perfectly
constitutional limitations that could be hypothetically applied. The
WEA possessed a powerful warrant under the agency-fee system.7 2
It was not unconstitutional for the citizens of Washington to constrain
the WEA's state-awarded authority by allocating more control over
the expenditure of agency fees to the nonmembers from whom they
were levied."3
In Davenport the Court's jurisprudence on expenditure
restrictions hinged on the source of funds and the means of
acquisition.74 Although campaign-finance precedent recognized that
spending money for political purposes triggered First Amendment
concerns, 75 the Court was troubled by the argument that unions had a
constitutional right to nonmembers' money to spend as they
pleased.76 In the WEA's defense, however, the collection of agency
fees in Washington was (and is) completely legal.77 Once those fees
are in the possession of the union, why should the law view them any
differently than funds collected from the voluntary dues of members
who want to "pitch in?' ' 78  The WEA complied with Hudson
procedures by allowing nonmembers to timely object to election-
related expenditures 79-waiting for affirmative consent seemed
unnecessarily burdensome.
Part of the answer that defused the WEA's position was located
in the Abood case, 80  which established the particular First
Amendment shield upon which the nonmembers relied. In the
aforementioned case, the Court found a clear First Amendment right
of employees not to be compelled to spend money for political
72. See id. at 2378.
73. See id. at 2379.
74. See id. at 2383.
75. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
76. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380.
77. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.59.100 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.760.
As of 2008, Washington State still endorsed the agency-fee system. See id.
78. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct.. at 2380-83. The union asserted there was no
difference due to their legal right to collect the fees. The Court dismissed this line
of reasoning-the idea that § 760 impermissibly encumbered funds in possession
of the union-in Part II-B. See id.
79. See id. at 2377-78.
80. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
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purposes they did not favor. 81 Appellants in the case argued that they
had been prohibited from refusing to associate themselves with the
advancement of political beliefs because their compulsory dues were
being put to that use by a union to which they did not belong. 2 The
Abood Court recited the Buckley principle that "contributing to an
organization for the purpose of spreading a political message is
protected by the First Amendment., 83 In Abood, however, that right
also applied to individuals who did not want to contribute but had no
other choice than to forfeit their jobs.
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make,
rather than prohibited from making, contributions for
political purposes works no less an infringement of
their constitutional rights. For at the heart of the First
Amendment is the notion that an individual should be
free to believe as he will, and that in a free society
one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his
conscience rather than coerced by the State. 84
Abood ultimately held that union political expenditures could only be
financed by those members who did not object to the use of their
money for that purpose. 85
In Part II-A, the Court recounted agency-fee precedent and
explained that § 760 did not upset the balance of rights between
unions and nonmembers. 86
B. Part II-A-Section 760 Squares with Precedent
Perhaps the best introduction to Part II-A is to re-cap the
individuals' First Amendment rights from Abood in light of the issue
in Davenport. Abood stood for the following proposition: unions
which collect agency fees from nonmembers cannot spend those fees
81. See id. at 233-35.
82. See id. at 234.
83. Id. (citing Buckley, 431 U.S. at 1).
84. Id. at 234-35.
85. See id. at 235-36.
86. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
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over the objection of nonmembers, who are forced to contribute the
money, because the individual nonmembers have a First Amendment
right that prevents the funds from being used for political purposes
the nonmembers do not support.87
However, the WEA argued that the Court must recognize a
union's First Amendment right to spend money for political
purposes.8 8 But the Court deflected that argument by relying on the
rights of nonmembers established in Abood. 9  Because the
nonmembers had a First Amendment right to direct the use of the
funds they were compelled to provide to the union, the Court
concluded that the WEA's right to spend those funds depended on
assent9" of the nonmembers. 91 In Abood, objecting nonmembers
were entitled to those agency fees that would be used for political
purposes even though the union had legally acquired the funds. 92
Moreover, in Davenport the Court determined that mandating the
union to obtain affirmative consent from nonmembers did not
impermissibly abridge the WEA's First Amendment right to spend
the agency fees on politics. 93 Davenport harkened the individual
right founded in Abood: Nonmembers must not be forced to
contribute money to political purposes they do not want to support.94
Therefore, unions are not constitutionally entitled to those agency
fees, despite being statutorily allowed to collect them. 95 There exists
a First Amendment right on the part of individuals that limits union
fee-use even after the money has left the control, or never entered the
direct control, of the individual nonmembers. 96
87. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
88. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380.
89. See id. at 2379.
90. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.760. Assent was manifested by a failure to
object, not to be confused with the § 760 requirement of "affirmative consent,"
which requires permission. See id.
91. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380. Basically, the union's ability to spend
agency fees on politics is not plenary. The First Amendment rights of nonmembers
temper the union's spending ability. See id.
92. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
93. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2383.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 2380-8 1.
96. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
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Since unions are not constitutionally entitled to agency fees,
consequently they do not possess the same First Amendment right to
spend that money as the individuals from whom it was taken.97 The
practical effect of the Davenport ruling is that agency fees do not
belong to the union unless the union complies with statutory
restrictions on how the money can be used. 98
With that rights-based groundwork at the fore, the Court
addressed the Supreme Court of Washington's mistaken reading of
Abood and other precedent. 99 Justice Scalia wrote, "The principle
reason the Supreme Court of Washington concluded that § 760 was
unconstitutional was that it believed that our agency-fee cases . . .
dictated that a nonmember must shoulder the burden of objecting
before a union can be barred from spending his fees for purposes
impermissible under Abood."'100 In other words, the default position
as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Washington allowed unions
to spend agency fees so long as the nonmember did not object.
Section 760 flipped that requirement through legislation, making it
illegal for unions to spend agency fees on politics unless the
nonmember authorized it, shifting the burden of compliance to the
union.101 The Washington Court viewed that role reversal as
upsetting a delicate constitutional balance between nonmembers and
unions in agency-fee states. 1
02
The Washington Court nurtured the principle expressed in
Hudson: "[D]issent is not to be presumed-it must affirmatively be
made known to the union by the dissenting employee."10 3 Did § 760
abate this Hudson principle by legislatively assigning the burden of
obtaining authorization to the union, instead of requiring
nonmembers to actively object? The Supreme Court of the United
States recognized the question, and answered in the affirmative.0 4
97. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380.
98. See id. To be clear, the concurring Justices did not expressly reach the
"other people's money" conclusion of Part II-B, though their interpretation of
Abood is in line with the rest of the Court. See id. at 2380-83.
99. See id. at 2379.
100. Id.
101. See WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.760.
102. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
103. Id. (quoting Chi. Teachers Union, Local 1, 475 U.S. at 306).
104. See id.
But the Court did not acquiesce in the argument that the § 760
requirement, placed on the unions by the voters of Washington State,
was an unconstitutional infringement of the WEA's First Amendment
rights.10 5 The WEA argued, successfully before the Supreme Court
of Washington, that § 760 "deviated from [the] perceived
constitutional balance by requiring unions to obtain affirmative
consent."' 1 6 The Washington Court therefore evaluated § 760 under
strict scrutiny, 107 and found it deficient.'08 The Supreme Court of the
United States, however, disagreed and explained that the Supreme
Court of Washington had meandered well beyond the scope of
Supreme Court of the United States precedent in agency-fee cases.' 09
The argument the WEA purveyed in Davenport rested in the
determination that the union retained the right to use agency fees as
allowed by Abood and Hudson. "0 The WEA argued below that the
Court had recognized a balance of rights in the previous cases that
gave nonmembers the ability to object to political expenditures, but
simultaneously bestowed the union with the right to spend the fees
for political purposes."' Any differing allocation of rights would be
a thumb on the scale, according to the Supreme Court of Washington,
and would disrupt the tender equilibrium that had been wrought
through judicial effort. 112
The Supreme Court of the United States did not countenance that
argument: "Those cases were not balancing constitutional rights in
the manner respondent suggests, for the simple reason that unions
have no constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-
employees."" 3 Quite simply, there was no constitutional midpoint of
nonmember and union rights; rather, nonmember rights to agency
105. See id. at 2383.
106. Id. at 2379.
107. See id.
108. See Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 130 P.3d 352.
109. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
110. See id.
11l. See id.
112. See id. The balance theory recognizes that there are two competing First
Amendment rights: the right of nonmembers to the use of agency fees as in Abood,
and the right to political speech as in Buckley. Id. As long as the agency-fee
system is in place, these two claims will be in tension. See id.
113. Id.
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fees outweighed the seemingly illusory right of the union to those
fees, if the state so legislated." 4  Why? Because the state gave
taxation power to the union, the state could take it away. Thus the
argument circled back to the proposition set forth at the origin of the
decision: § 760 acts as a "modest limitation upon an extraordinary
benefit,,1 granted to the WEA by Washington, not the United States
Constitution.
As an extraordinary power positively conferred by state statute,
the agency-fee system can be tailored by further legislation, even
legislation that implements a statutory regime with which the union
must comply before spending agency fees for election-related
purposes. "6 That, in essence, is the Davenport holding, and similar
to the reasoning of Hudson, by which the Court established
procedural safeguards for union nonmembers. 117
The Davenport Court stated that the limitations of Abood and
Hudson were constitutional minimums. 1 8  Abood afforded a
nonmember the opportunity to object to a union's political use of
agency fees, and Hudson outlined a basic procedure for union
compliance with Abood. "' But "the mere fact that Washington
required more than the Hudson minimum does not trigger First
Amendment scrutiny. The constitutional floor for unions' collection
and spending of agency fees is not also a constitutional ceiling for
state-imposed restrictions."120 Thus, the Court ruled that the state-
granted nature of the union power to collect agency fees would not
preclude the state legislature (or state voters) from modifying the
conditions of such a windfall to the union. 12'
Also, it was important for the Court to note who maintained the
power to place conditions, such as § 760, on the agency-fee
114. See id.
115. Id. at 2378.
116. See id. at 2383.
117. See Chi. Teachers Union, Local 1, 475 U.S. 292.
118. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
119. See id. (quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990))
("[W]e have described Hudson as 'outlin[ing] a minimum set of procedures by
which a [public-sector] union in an agency-shop relationship could meet its
requirement under A bood. "').
120. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
121. See id.
system. 122 The cipher to the Washington court's misreading of the
"[d]issent is not to be presumed" principle rested in that court's
concern that unions would be entirely stopped from spending on
politics due to one hold-out objecter. 123 The Supreme Court of the
United States countered: "We meant only that it would be improper
for a court to enjoin the expenditure of the agency fees of all
employees, including those who had not objected, when the statutory
or constitutional limitations established in those [previous] cases
could be satisfied by a narrower remedy."'124 But the judiciary's duty
to find the least obstructive solution did not apply to the other
branches of government. 125 The statutory entitlement that allowed
unions to collect agency fees from nonmembers could be limited by
legislatures or voters, who had breathed life into the agency-fee
122. See id.
123. See id. (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306 n.16). The Court did not mean
the judiciary could enjoin the union from spending agency fees contributed by non-
objectors, only that the proper remedy would be limited to stopping unions from
spending the money of people who objected. See id. In the case of § 760, each
individual nonmember who wanted his agency fees to be spent for political
purposes had the opportunity to authorize-not object to-that expenditure of his
contributed portion. See WASH. REV CODE § 42.17.760. The Supreme Court of
Washington viewed the § 760 consent requirement as an unduly burdensome
restriction of the union's right to spend agency fees, subject to heightened scrutiny.
See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379. However, the Supreme Court of the United
States did not abide by that argument, partly because the union did not have to
commingle the agency fees with the voluntary dues, and because it could spend the
agency fees for non-political purposes under Washington law without prohibition.
See id. at 2380 n.2. Section 760 simply meant the WEA could not spend agency
fees for political purposes, unless the nonmember consented. See id. But that was
the policy point of § 760, to make it easier for nonmembers to retain control over
the fees they paid to the union as a condition of being employed by the state. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.760. Currently, ninety-five percent of Washington
State public schoolteachers belong to the WEA and voluntarily contribute dues.
See Zena McFadden, Davenport, Gary, et aL & Washington v. Washington
Education Assn., NORTHWESTERN. UNIV. MEDILL JOURNALISM (2006),
http://docket.medill.northwestem.edu/archives/003887.php. Section 760 created an
exception for the protection of teachers who did not want to belong to the union,
but still had to pay. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.760.
124. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379. The Court cited Abood, Street, and
Hudson as examples of their "narrow remedy" reasoning. Id.
125. See id.
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system. 126 Section 760 was such a limitation and would not be struck
down. 27
Part I-A can be summarized as follows. Two First Amendment
rights claims conflicted. The first right, recognized in Abood,
entitled a union nonmember to prevent his or her portion of
compulsory agency fees from political use by objecting to the union's
expenditure of the fees for that purpose. 28  The second right,
established in Buckley and referenced in Abood, recognized that
spending money on certain election-related purposes was protected
speech.1 29 The Washington court had viewed these rights in perfect
harmony, unable to be disjoined; but the Supreme Court of the
United States determined the strength of each claim by examining the
source of the funds and the legitimacy of each asserted interest.1 30
As to agency fees, the nonmembers who had a slice of their
paychecks automatically transferred to the union maintained a
constitutional entitlement to that money, which allowed them to
object to certain forms of union expenditure, i.e., political use. 13'
The union, however, enjoyed no constitutional entitlement to the
agency fee, even though collecting it was legal under state law,1 32
because Abood had drawn a distinction between voluntary fees of
members and involuntary fees of nonmembers.1 33 The Abood right
of nonmembers to object trumped the union's ability to spend, even
though the union could freely spend its members' voluntary
contributions. 134 The "balance" had thus remained since Abood was
decided in 1977, with Hudson giving procedural guidance on how to
secure the Abood right in 1986.135 Davenport calcified Abood in two
ways: (1) by reinvigorating the concept of nonmembers' substantial
interest in agency fees and their subsequent use, 136 and (2) by
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
129. See id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1).
130. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
131. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
132. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
133. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
134. See id.
135. See Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310.
136. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379-80.
exposing the agency-fee system as an extraordinary, conferred
benefit,1 37 subject to limits enacted through the democratic
process.' 38  Section 760 rested on the Abood premise that
nonmembers had rights to agency fees. Therefore, § 760 placed a
condition on the private taxation power of the unions that provided
further protection of nonmembers and mandated compliance by the
union.1 39 The Court found the limitation acceptable 4 ° as an exercise
in controlling a positive right granted by the state for the benefit of a
private entity.
C. Part II-B-Additional Concerns
1. Encumbrance
With the conclusion of Part I-A, a rare moment of Court
unanimity flitted away. The issues addressed in Part II-B arose from
different arguments141 than the Court's deconstruction of the
Supreme Court of Washington's opinion of the case in Part II-A.
Consequently, three Justices refrained from Part I-B, finding Part II-
A a sufficient resolution of the case.142 However, Part I-B presented
important principles that shaped the impact Davenport will have in
future controversies. While the Court in Part I-A attacked the
judgment below based on the Supreme Court of Washington's faulty
rights reasoning,1 43 Part II-B dealt directly with the premise that the
Washington court proposed independent of rights-balancing
precedent, namely, that § 760 impermissibly encumbered funds that
were lawfully within the WEA's possession. 144 The encumbrance-
137. See id. at 2378.
138. See id. at 2379.
139. See WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.760.
140. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2383.
141. See id. at 2380.
142. See id. at 2383. Justices Alito, Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts did not
join Part II-B. See id.
143. See id. at 2379.
144. See id. at 2380; see Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 130 P.3d at
363-64.
Section 760 then encumbers the use of such funds by prohibiting
their expenditure for political speech absent affirmative
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theory reasoning offered by the WEA differed from the
constitutional-balance theory upon which the Supreme Court of
Washington ultimately decided the case, as presented in Part II-A. 145
The Supreme Court of the United States noted that the encumbrance
premise 46 led the respondent to call upon campaign-finance cases to
defend the union's right to spend "its" money for political purposes:
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti147 and Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce. 148
In Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that
restricted a banking association from spending its money to oppose a
state referendum that would have amended the Massachusetts
Constitution to include a graduated income tax.149 Massachusetts
had enacted a criminal statute that limited such associations'
contributions to certain types of political issues, specifically
excluding associations from speaking (by spending) on issues that
did not materially affect the "property, business or assets of the
corporation." 5 ' The Court found that the association, a corporation,
did not possess lesser First Amendment rights to political speech
because of its corporate character or the political views it sought to
promote. 15 Therefore, the corporation's right to speak and the
nature of the speech, absent a compelling state interest to regulate it,
rendered the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional.152 "The speech
proposed . . . [was] at the heart of the First Amendment's
authorization by the agency fee paying nonmember. Notably, the
statute acknowledges that the fees are in the union's possession
but places restrictions upon the use of the union's funds for
political speech.
See Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm 'n, 130 P.3d at 363-64.
145. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379.
146. See id. at 2380.
147. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
148. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Comm., 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
149. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765. This footnote refers to the case syllabus
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions.
150. See id. This footnote refers to the case syllabus prepared by the Reporter
of Decisions.
151. See id. at 784.
152. See id. at 795.
protection." '153 In Davenport, the WEA compared its position to that
of the Bellotti association by claiming that § 760 impermissibly
blocked them from speaking politically, which would include
speaking for or against ballot propositions as the First Amendment
allows. 154
However, in Austin, the Court upheld a Michigan campaign
finance statute that prevented the Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, a nonprofit corporation, from using general treasury
funds to run a newspaper advertisement in support of a specific
candidate for a specific office.1 55  The Court found the state
provision narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, and
thus declined to invalidate it.156 Significant to the decision for the
WEA's purposes was the Court's inclination to sanction corporate
campaign finance expenditure restrictions on the grounds that
153. See id. at 776. The Court further elaborated by citing Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all
matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment. . . . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic
function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is
needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period.
Id.
154. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380.
155. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 652. This footnote refers to the case syllabus
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions.
156. See id. at 655-58. The act exempted from regulation expenditures which
were made from the corporation's segregated fund for the specific purpose of
political advocacy. See id. at 655.
To determine whether Michigan's restriction on corporate political
expenditures may constitutionally be applied to the Chamber, we must
ascertain whether it burdens the exercise of political speech and, if it does,
whether it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest ...
Certainly, the use of funds to support a political candidate is "speech;"
independent campaign expenditures constitute "political expression 'at the
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms."'...
The mere fact that the Chamber is a corporation does not remove its
speech from the ambit of the First Amendment.
Id. at 657 (citations omitted). But the compelling state interest was that "the unique
legal and economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some regulation of
their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption."
Id. at 658.
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corporations had special legal privileges that enhanced their gravity
in the political game:
State law grants corporations special advantages-
such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable
treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets-that enhance their ability to attract capital and
to deploy their resources in ways that maximize the
return on their shareholders' investments. These state-
created advantages not only allow corporations to play
a dominant role in the Nation's economy, but also
permit them to use "resources amassed in the
economic marketplace" to obtain "an unfair advantage
in the political marketplace." 157
In Austin, the Court recognized a compelling interest in combating
corruption and justified counteracting the "influence of political war
chests funneled through the corporate form."' 58  The Davenport
Court mentioned that the WEA's focus on Austin drew attention to §
760's exclusive effect on unions while exempting corporations,
which the Court found suspicious in Austin. ' 59
The two campaign finance arguments were packaged by the
Davenport Court: "[The WEA] argues that, under the rigorous First
Amendment scrutiny required by [Bellotti and Austin], § 760 is
unconstitutional because it applies to ballot propositions and because
it does not limit equivalent election-related expenditures by
corporations."'1 60 The point was reminiscent of a similar contention
proffered by the union in Part II-A that the WEA should be
considered harmless because it was legally allowed to collect agency
fees and had complied with Hudson procedures in protecting the
rights of nonmembers. 161 The Court dispatched with that argument
in Part I-A by setting the relative rights of the nonmembers and
unions in the proper relation under precedent, and vindicating the
157. Id. at 658-59 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
257 (1986)).
158. Id. at 659 (quoting Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 257).
159. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 2377-78.
state's ability to build on the minimum regulatory floor of Hudson. 162
Yet the union believed its campaign finance argument had teeth. Had
not the Court continuously recognized a First Amendment speech
and associational right in the expenditure of money for political
endeavors? 163 Section 760 explicitly limited the ability of the WEA
to exercise that right without limiting any other political players.' 
64
But the Court distinguished the campaign finance cases cited as
"not on point."1 65 The operative difference, according to the Court,
rested in the source of the funds and the means of acquisition-that
in Davenport the money originated from nonmembers who were
forced by law to pay.' 66 Part II-A had established the Abood rights
of nonmembers to be protected from political expenditures of agency
fees; Hudson laid the procedural groundwork for doing so;' 67 and
Washington law authorized an agency-fee system for union
funding, 68 the well from which the WEA drew. Therefore, the
money in Davenport had been exacted under state authorization from
people who did not want to pay, but the WEA's campaign finance
cases dealt only with the rights of organizations to spend money
contributed voluntarily by their members.' 
69
The distinction made the whole case for the Court; in fact, the
WEA's reliance on their possession of the fees as the linchpin to a
campaign finance argument was brushed aside as "entirely
immaterial." 170 Another aspect of the agency-fee system influenced
the Court more than any encumbrance argument: "What matters is
that public-sector agency fees are in the union's possession only
because Washington and its union-contracting government agencies
have compelled their employees to pay those fees."' 17 1 Unlike either
162. See id. at 2379.
163. See e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.
164. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.760.
165. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 2379.
168. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 41.59.060, 41.59.100.
169. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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Bellotti or Austin, the WEA's money was rooted in coercion. 17 2
Thus, the cornerstone of the Court's holding, which appeared by
allusion in Part II-A, came to light: "[Section] 760 is not fairly
described as a restriction on how the union can spend 'its' money; it
is a condition placed upon the union's extraordinary state entitlement
to acquire and spend other people's money." 173
Justice Scalia then interrupted the decision with an important
footnote.174 The WEA had failed in every aspect of its defense, but
Justice Scalia provided some direction midstream. He assured the
union that they "might have had a point, if' § 760 burdened the
WEA's ability to spend the dues of its own members. 175 The Court
recognized the First Amendment issue at stake for the union: the
right to spend money on political speech. But as Scalia gave with
one hand, he took with the other, declaring that "[t]he only reason
respondent's use of its members' dues was burdened is that
respondent chose to commingle those dues with nonmembers'
agency fees."'176 Better accounting practices might have saved the
day for the WEA because any incidental burden on member dues
arising from lazy bookkeeping was chalked up to the WEA's laxity,
not any imposition of § 760. Furthermore, the Court informed the
WEA that current technology would likely ease the transition from
Hudson minimums to § 760 affirmative-consent compliance by
providing nonmembers with a facile method by which to confirm
their agency-fee desires. 177 In the eyes of the Court, the WEA's own
practices were the greatest obstacle to compliance with § 760.178
Section 760 survived the rights-balancing analysis of Part I-A
and the encumbrance theory of the campaign-finance cases. Next
came the constitutional question of whether § 760 impermissibly
drew distinctions based on the content of the WEA's political
speech. 7
9
172. See id. (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767-77; and Austin, 494 U.S. at 654-
56). The Court cited Bellotti and Austin in contrast to Davenport. See id.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 2380 n.2.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 2380.
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2. Content-Based Discrimination
Notwithstanding the ease with which the Court discarded the
WEA's former arguments, the Court respected the First Amendment
issues at stake in Davenport because the Buckley principle of political
speech still rings true.' 80 Therefore, as the WEA brought to light its
concerns about § 760's impact on speech and associational rights, the
Court delved into an analysis of permissible content-based speech
restrictions and sketched an outline of circumstances in which
content discrimination was afforded.' 8' The catalyst in such cases,
said the Court, was whether a speech prohibition, "raises the specter
that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace."' 82
"It is true enough that content-based regulations of speech are
presumptively invalid."' 83  Did § 760 stifle the WEA's right to
political speech based on the substance of the causes, elections, and
ballot propositions the agency fees were spent to support? The Court
decided that it did not. 184  Where the risk that the government is
trying to exclude certain ideas from public dialogue is
"inconsequential,"1 85 strict scrutiny of the speech prohibition is
"unwarranted."' 186 The Court counted four examples: (1) obscene or
defamatory speech "can be constitutionally proscribed because the
social interest in order and morality outweighs the negligible
contribution of those categories of speech to the marketplace of
ideas;"' 87  (2) the government can discriminate within classes of
banned speech to proscribe only the most prurient speech;1 88 (3) "the
180. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; see also Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 101-02.
181. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2381.
182. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
183. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2381.
184. See id. at 2381-82.
185. Id. at 2381.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-84 (1992)).
188. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2381 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 388 (1992)). "Content discrimination among various instances of a class of
proscribable speech does not pose a threat to the marketplace of ideas when the
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government can make content-based distinctions when it subsidizes
speech;"189 and (4) "when the government permits speech on
government property . . . [in] a nonpublic forum, it can exclude
speakers on the basis of their subject matter, so long as the
distinctions drawn are ... reasonable .. "..",190 The rationale behind
all four instances being that such limitations on speech are not
accomplished in order to drive out certain views, but are reasonably
applied to the circumstances in light of other considerations. 191
The Court conceded that § 760 restrictions placed on the WEA
did not qualify as one of the four neat and tidy options cited.192
However, the "principle underlying"1 93 those scenarios does apply to
Davenport. Section 760 likely caused content-based discrimination
to a minute degree in affecting the union's ability to spend a sliver of
their funds for political purposes-an incidental effect, but
discrimination nonetheless. The Court did not fight that premise, but
instead focused on the reason voters passed § 760 and the nature of
the entitlement that § 760 restricted in light of the admonition that the
law concerns itself with distortions in the marketplace of ideas.
1 94
The Court concluded that the limitation was "reasonable" and
"viewpoint-neutral" as a permissible condition on Washington's
"general authorization allowing public-sector unions to acquire and
spend the money of government employees."' 
95
According to the Court, the voters of Washington had a good
reason for passing § 760: "to protect the integrity of the election
process."'1 96 But so did Congress before Buckley, and the state of
Massachusetts in Bellotti. How could the Court justify allowing a
content-based restriction after habitually lifting up political spending
selected subclass is chosen for the very reason that the entire class can be
proscribed." Id.
189. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2381 (citing Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548-50 (1983)).
190. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2381 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799-800, 806 (1985)).
191. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2381.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
as a core First Amendment principle? Even if the voters thought
labor unions plagued their electoral system, what complaint could
they lodge in the face of the Constitution and state law that
specifically legalized an agency-fee system where the union had
already complied with procedural safeguards for the protection of
nonmembers? There had to be more to it than just an interest that the
voters of Washington acted to address. After all, the whole point of
constitutional rights is to prevent the government (acting in its many
capacities, whether legislature or voter majorities) from treading on
rights secured against abuses. The desire to restrain unions, like the
WEA, had to be justified on sturdier ground. To the Court, that
meant a direct tie-in between the voters' wishes and the state-
authorized nature of the agency-fee system validated a speech
restriction:
The restriction on the state-bestowed entitlement was
thus limited to the state-created harm that the voters
sought to remedy. The voters did not have to enact an
across-the-board limitation on the use of nonmembers'
agency fees by public-sector unions in order to
vindicate their more narrow concern with the integrity
of the election process.
1 9 7
Two ideas come back into frame: (1) the state of Washington
could completely abolish the agency-fee system at will, 198 meaning
that the WEA only possessed agency-fees because the state granted
them the extraordinary power to collect; and (2) the speech right of
the nonmembers highlighted in Abood attenuated the union's right to
the fees even after collection.' 99  The Court calculated the
permissibility of a content-based speech restriction with those
realities in mind-an attendant speech limitation of § 760 was
excused by the fact that other, more fundamental speech rights were
honored, and the state's right to modify its scheme for conferring
positive rights was secured. °
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. See id. at 2378.
199. See id. at 2379.
200. See id. at 2381-82.
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Moreover, "no suppression of ideas [was] afoot, since the union
remain[ed] as free as any other entity to participate in the electoral
process with all available funds other than the state-coerced agency
fees lacking affirmative permission." 20' The "unique context" of the
law, regarding the agency-fee system arrangement in Washington,
led the Court to determine that "the content-based nature of § 760
[did] not violate the First Amendment." 20 2 Having favored the state
and the nonmember class on the balance of constitutional rights,
campaign finance, and content-based discrimination grounds, little
remained for the Court to do but to limit the holding of the case as
applied to public-sector unions.
3. Limitations of the Holding
The Davenport Court upheld § 760 only as applied to public-
sector unions, such as the WEA, and did not address private-sector
employee unions.203 Even though the statute facially applied to both
types, the Court found an analysis of § 760's effect on private-sector
unions unnecessary.20 4 The Court noted that under the NLRA "it is
generally not an unfair labor practice for private-sector employers to
enter into agency-shop arrangements, . . but States retain the power
under the Act to ban the execution or application of such
arrangements., 2 5 Therefore existing labor law already accounted for
the propriety of restricting private-sector unions in ways similar to
the limitations placed upon the WEA by § 760.206 Those private
matters resided in a realm of contract and labor law, whereby
employees agreed to be subjected to an agency-fee regime as part of
an employment contract, the terms of which other sources of law,
such as the NLRA, regulated.20 7 According to the Court, those
201. Id. at 2382.
202. Id.
203. See id. There must be no confusion here. The WEA is a private
association, but its clientele are public-sector employees. See id. Unions that
represent employees in other, private, industries in Washington State are private-
sector unions. See id.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 2383 n.3.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 2383.
relationships presented "a somewhat different constitutional
question,, 20 8 which did not demand an answer in the present
litigation.
20 9
Additionally, the WEA did not present an "overbreadth
challenge," which would have alleged the statute invalid due to a
"chilling effect" on free expression.210  "Instead, respondent . . .
consistently argued simply that § 760 [was] unconstitutional as
applied to itself."211  The Court recited that the only instance in
which the WEA concerned itself with the application of § 760 to the
private sector dealt with § 760's effect of generally limiting election-
related speech-another "immaterial" argument to the Court.212
Though § 760 affected the election system in Washington, it
applied differently to public-sector unions, such as the WEA.213
When it came to the public-sector unions, associations that escaped
the grip of the NLRA, § 760 applied as a state-created "condition" on
the entitlement "to coerce fees from government employees. ,214
Whether or not § 760 was constitutional as applied to private-sector
unions had "no bearing on whether § 760 [was] constitutional as
applied to public-sector unions., 215 Because the effect of § 760 to
private-sector unions had no effect on the application of § 760 to the
WEA, the Court limited the application of Davenport to public-sector
unions, such as the WEA, and those similarly situated.216
After considering all the arguments mustered by the WEA, the
Court held that requiring public-sector unions to obtain affirmative
208. See id. The Court opined that the end result of analyzing § 760 as applied
to private-sector unions might not differ. Id. at 2383 n.4. But the question would
not be answered in Davenport. See id. at 2383.
209. See id.
210. Id. Overbreadth doctrine: "The doctrine holding that if a statute is so
broadly written that it deters free expression, then it can be struck down on its face
because of its chilling effect--even if it also prohibits acts that may legitimately be
forbidden." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 507 (2d pocket ed., 2001). The Court
cites its application in Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633-
34 (1980). See also Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2383 n.5.
211. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. 2382.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 2382-83.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2383.
216. See id. at 2382.
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consent of the union's agency-fee-paying nonmembers before
spending those fees for political purposes did not violate the First
Amendment. 21 7  The Court vacated the Supreme Court of
Washington's opinion and remanded.218
D. Concurrence
Justice Breyer, with the Chief Justice and Justice Alito, abstained
from Part I-B in a brief concurrence. 219 They joined only Part I, Part
I-A, and the second paragraph of the second footnote of the
opinion.220  The decision below "rested entirely on flawed
interpretations of this Court's agency-fee cases," wrote Justice
Breyer.221  That also included the weak reasoning of First
Amendment associational rights precedent from Boy Scouts of
America.2
22
But the concurring Justices declined to rule on Part II-B because
the issues there were not addressed by a lower court. 223 For example,
the concurrence cited the Austin issue of applying campaign finance
restrictions evenhandedly to unions and corporations, an issue the
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States addressed, as not
presented for decision. 224 Justice Breyer referred to a footnote in the
Supreme Court of Washington's ruling that stated, "The parties have
not raised, and we [the Supreme Court of Washington] do not
address, any argument concerning § 760's application solely to labor
217. See id. at 2383.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. Part I introduced the problem, including an outline of § 760 and
Washington's agency-fee system. See id. at 2376-78. Part II-A discussed the
Supreme Court of Washington's unacceptable treatment of precedent. See id. at
2379. The second paragraph of the second footnote dismissed the Supreme Court
of Washington's "invocation of the union's expressive associational rights under
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, [530 U.S. 640 (2000)]." Id. at 2380 n.2. The Justices
did not concur in the court's reasoning concerning the encumbrance (campaign
finance) argument, content-based discrimination, or the holding's limitation to
public-sector unions. See id. at 2380-83.
221. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2383.
222. See id. at 2378; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
223. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2383.
224. See id.
organizations while nonprofit, corporate, and other groups are not
similarly subject to affirmative authorization requirements." '225 The
WEA did not raise those questions below, but for the first time in
briefs before the Supreme Court of the United States.226 Invoking
the example of National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Smith,227
the concurring Justices declined to address such arguments until
lower courts entertained those issues. 228
V. IMPACT
To consider the impact of Davenport means choosing between
two very different alternatives. It takes little effort to learn that while
the Court was making its decision, the legislature in Washington
changed the agency-fee law to redefine the application of § 760 to the
unions, making it much easier to comply, and much less likely that
another § 760 challenge would arise. 229  The Court noted this
amendment to state law in the first footnote of the Davenport
decision.230
On the other hand, Davenport offers a valuable peek at the
Court's vision for future cases involving extraordinary state-granted
entitlements, such as the power of private taxation. In the context of
administrative law, the unanimity of the Court is noteworthy.
Davenport may be a First Amendment case at heart, but the reality of
expansive due process rights in a post-Goldberg231 era might cause
the reader to question the Court's distinction of the WEA's statutory
and constitutional right to spend agency fees,232 which Washington
granted the union full authority to collect. Do agency fees constitute
a property interest, or are they just a mere privilege that a voter
majority can effectively revoke through a ballot initiative? Most
225. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm 'n, 130 P.3d at 362 n.6.
226. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2383.
227. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470 n.7 (1999)
(citing precedent that held the Court was not positioned to review alternative
theories advanced by respondent in that case).
228. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2383.
229. See WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.760(2).
230. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377 n.1.
231. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
232. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380-81.
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aspects of the Court's reasoning in Davenport suggest that the Court
will peer unfavorably upon those beneficiaries who presume too
much, by asking for more protection of an "unusual" entitlement than
the Court thinks due. And how will the decision affect forthcoming
campaign finance cases, especially the reasoning by Justice Scalia
that Justices Breyer, Roberts, and Alito did not join?233 These and
other important questions will recur, and though the WEA might not
be involved, other associations will be subject to the Court's strong
stance on a state's authority to modify the positive rights that it
imparts.
First though, the interpretation that Davenport means very little in
the grand scheme.
A. The "Impotent" Interpretation
On impact, the Davenport decision seems to affect thousands of
schoolteachers and other public employees. The Court debilitated
each argument the WEA brought in defense of noncompliance with §
760, emphasizing the Court's position that public schoolteachers
have a fundamental First Amendment right to be protected from the
use of their agency fees for union political activity. Such a strong
statement in favor of the individuals clearly established that Abood
would be respected; that nonmembers, who have opted out of
support, control how their "tax" is spent, and even that the money did
not "belong" to the union. 234 Proponents of the teachers' rights and §
760 were pleased with the victory.235
But satisfaction with the decision could not be sustained, for two
reasons: (1) the Court did not abolish the agency-fee system; and (2)
the Washington legislature enervated the Court's holding by
amending § 760 in favor of the WEA. One commentator lamented:
233. See id.
234. See id. at 2380.
235. See, e.g., Booker T. Stallworth, Teachers and EFF Win Unanimous
Victory at U.S. Supreme Court (June 14, 2007),
http://www.effwa.org/main/article.php?articleid=2069&number=56. One such
proponent: Evergreen Freedom Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank
that had supported the petitioner teacher class throughout the litigation, put forth a
press release shortly after the announcement highlighting their satisfaction with the
ruling. See id.
"The decision the nine justices handed down won't really affect
anyone going forward-the public employees have to keep paying
and the union can keep collecting." 236  Accordingly, the general
counsel of the National Education Association, the WEA's parent
union, expressed a happy acceptance with the Court's ruling because
it had "little or no practical impact., 237
Unfortunately, Bastiat's prediction about the systemic nature of
legal plunder238 has come to full bloom. In agency-fee states, such as
Washington, a private taxation system still enables union juggernauts
to extract money from teachers' paychecks simply as a condition of
employment in the profession. The Court has recognized the
constitutional tension such a system creates, specifically with the
pronouncement of nonmember rights in Abood and procedural
safeguards in Hudson. But they have declined to further question the
propriety of the system itself. To be sure, the Court's
characterization of the WEA's First Amendment arguments as
"counterintuitive ' 239 addressed the constitutional concern of who
"owns" the agency fees by exposing the union's rights reasoning as
backward and self-interested to a fault. Furthermore, the dismissal of
the WEA's campaign-finance claims struck the right chord. The
union's insistence that § 760 be invalidated because it did not treat
corporations equally with unions did not measure Up;240 corporations
collect donations contributed voluntarily by supporters with
congruent political goals, but the WEA has a monopolistic right-of-
way to siphon funds from individuals who have specifically chosen
to withdraw from association with the union. The only equivalent
authority in government is the sovereign taxation power of the state.
The Court attacked the agency-fee system collaterally though,
and it is not certain that the Court would do away with the system
even if it decided to tread into Washington democratic processes.
236. Center for Individual Freedom, Winning a Unanimous High Court
Decision While Gaining Nothing, (June 22, 2007),
http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/legal-issues/legal updates/us-supreme-court/davenport
-v-washington-ed.htm.
237. Id. (quoting the National Education Association's General Counsel Bob
Chanin).
238. See BASTIAT, supra note 2.
239. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. 2378.
240. See id. at 2380.
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Those state democratic processes, however, including the WEA's
lobbying arm, responded outright to the Davenport decision in true
rent-seeking 241 fashion by successfully insulating the WEA from the
clarion rebuke of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In May 2007, about a month before the release of the Davenport
opinion, the Washington legislature changed § 760.242 The original
version contained only subsection (1), which read, "A labor
organization may not use agency shop fees paid by an individual who
is not a member of the organization to make contributions or
expenditures to influence an election or to operate a political
committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individual
(emphasis added). 243  The new subsection (2) defined the word
"use" as applied in subsection (1) to make strict union compliance
with subsection (1) less important, and the practice of segregating
member and nonmember funds unnecessary. The new section
provided: "A labor organization does not use agency shop fees when
it uses its general treasury funds to make such contributions or
expenditures if it has sufficient revenues from sources other than
agency shop fees in its general treasury to fund such contributions or
expenditures (emphasis added). 244 The effect of the new provision
seems to be that the union must still obtain permission from the
nonmember before the agency fees are spent for political purposes,
but that any expenditure of money from the union's general treasury,
whether derived from member or nonmember sources, does not
constitute an expenditure regulated by subsection (1). Therefore, the
WEA can generally spend for political purposes without obtaining
nonmember consent, so long as it maintains a balance in the treasury
241. See Dr. Paul M. Johnson, Rent-seeking behavior, in A Glossary of
Political Economy Terms, (2005), http://www.auburn.edu/-johnspm/gloss/rent-
seeking-behavior. The term "rent-seeking" refers to "[t]he expenditure of
resources in order to bring about an uncompensated transfer of goods or services
from another person or persons to one's self as the result of a 'favorable' decision
on some public policy." See id.
242. See, e.g., Ross Runkle, Davenport v. WEA Developments, (May 17,
2007), http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2O07/O5/davenport-v_wea.html; see also
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.760 (crediting the creation of the statute to
Initiative Measure 134, approved by the voters of Washington as a ballot initiative
Nov. 3, 1992).
243. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.760(1).
244. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.760(2).
that exceeds the total amount collected in the form of agency fees
from nonmembers. In other words, the union can spend freely as
long as enough money remains to refund nonmembers. The Court's
advice to implement stricter accounting practices and segregation of
nonmember agency fees for purposes of authorization fell on deaf
ears. The Washington legislature endorsed an accounting of
complete fungibility, with no accountability on the WEA's part to
trace sources of income to nonmember agency fees. Consequently,
nonmembers must give permission to the union if the union is to
spend their agency fees, but the union does not have to wait for such
confirmation before it spends out of the very account in which
agency fees are deposited. And thus, the state legislature completed
the WEA's bridge to circumvention.
In Washington, little will change in practice. The professionals
who want to teach in the state's school system but do not want to join
the union will continue to pay their tax to the WEA, and the state
legislature will be on guard to protect the entrenched interests from
additional reckoning. But Davenport could be an important decision
for broader jurisprudential reasons. The Court's stance on individual
First Amendment rights, and how to balance them against positive
grants of state entitlement, reflects a fundamental understanding of
the nature of government that could have continuing implications.
B. Jurisprudence and Future Consequences
"Washington [State] could have gone much further . " ,245
Justice Scalia tersely declared that the state-granted nature of the
WEA's agency fees subjected the whole agency-fee system to deep
modification or abolition; and the unanimous Court accepted that
premise. 246  The Court's argument manifested a famous and
polemical doctrine of legal reasoning: "The greater includes the
lesser." On the understanding that § 760 placed only a limited
condition upon a full legislative regime of agency-fee procurement,
the provision constituted a mere narrow regulatory option within a
wider acceptable set of more drastic options. 247  This conclusion
245. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378.
246. See id. The quote appeared in the introductory paragraph of Part II, to
which all nine justices joined. See id.
247. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378.
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motivated the Court's rationale for upholding § 760 as a
constitutionally permissible condition on the WEA's use of agency
fees. 24
8
Professor Michael Herz examined the merits and pitfalls of the
greater-includes-the-lesser argument in a 1994 law review article.249
He explained that it was a familiar friend to the Court, perhaps well-
worn, but nonetheless recurring, 250 attributed most directly to Justice
Holmes, but utilized also by assorted contemporaries such as Justices
White, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Stevens, Blackmun, and Davenport's
own Justice Scalia. 251 The logic that the state's agency-fee system
could be conditioned by § 760 comported with the understanding that
the greater power possessed by Washington to create the system in
the first place included the lesser power to regulate the use of benefits
obtained by virtue of the system's existence.
Unadorned with refining jurisprudence, the greater-includes-the
lesser argument can sometimes lead to suspect conclusions. An
example from Herz: Justice Holmes's famous decision in McAuliffe
v. Mayor of New Bedford,252 where Officer McAuliffe was
permissibly dismissed from the city's police force for violating a rule
248. See id. at 2379.
249. See Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument that the
Greater Includes the Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REv. 227, 238-49 (1994). Professor
Herz spends eleven pages presenting the logic of the doctrine and exposing its
weaknesses. See id. He cites three significant problems: (1) "[T]he argument
obviously is only valid if in fact the greater power exists." Id. at 241. (2) "[T]he
second obvious error in relying on the greater-includes-the-lesser argument occurs
when one proposition is not in fact 'the lesser' of the other." Id. at 242. And (3)
[T]he third trap of this argument-another way in which the lesser is not
in fact a subset of the greater-is what logicians call the fallacy of
composition, or its flip-side, the fallacy of division. The fallacies arise
because a set-theoretic approach is not always valid. In set theory,
components or elements of the set do not interact; they are unaffected by
being grouped together. In the real world this is not necessarily the case.
For example, sodium chloride is a harmless substance (table salt). But
that does not mean that either sodium or chlorine is harmless; because of
their interaction the components do not necessarily share the
characteristics of the whole, and vice versa.
Id. at 243.
250. See id. at 238 n.45 (citing Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850)).
251. See id. at 240 n.51.
252. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
that prohibited him from engaging in political speech as a condition
of his employment.253  Modem courts have disparaged that
conclusion, and McAuliffe no longer represents the state of the
law.254 However, this Holmesian deduction, though perhaps the
most important analytical basis of the Court's decision, did not
exclusively account for the Court's conclusion that § 760 was a
constitutional condition applied to Washington's agency-fee
system. 255
The Davenport Court recognized another major consideration-
the Abood right of union nonmembers overpowered the WEA's
contention for control of agency fees. Thus, the reason for allowing
§ 760 to remain as a condition upon the agency-fee system, although
making use of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument, pivoted
substantially on the countervailing constitutional right of
nonmembers to refuse forced political association, 25 6 despite the
inclination of inferior courts to sympathize with the WEA's anti-
253. See Herz, supra note 249, at 244 (quoting McAuliffe, 29 N.E. 517).
254. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983); see, e.g., Pereira v.
Comm'n of Soc. Services, 733 N.E.2d 112, 117 (Mass. 2000).
The question [of whether a government employee could be discharged on
a basis that infringes a constitutional interest in free speech] would not be
considered substantial if the view of Justice Holmes, expressed more than
a century ago, had prevailed. In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,
(citation omitted) the court dismissed a police officer's challenge to a
police regulation prohibiting the solicitation of political contributions
because, "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." ... This view has
not prevailed. In a long line of cases the Supreme Court has clarified that,
when a public employer attempts to discharge or otherwise discipline an
employee who exercises a right that is constitutionally protected, the
employer is subject to some restraint. (citations omitted) A public
employer therefore "may not discharge an employee on a basis that
infringes that employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of
speech." (citations omitted) To decide whether a public employee has an
actionable claim for the infringement of her First Amendment rights, we
must determine first, based on "the content, form, and context of [the]
given statement, as revealed by the whole record," (citation omitted)
whether the public employee was speaking "as a citizen upon matters of
public concern."
Pereira, 733 N.E.2d at 117.
255. See Davenport, 127 S. Ct. 2378-83.
256. See id. at 2379.
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Holmesian arguments of unconstitutional speech infringement. The
placement of a condition (the lesser) upon a state-created system (the
greater) includes the requirement that the condition, in its own right,
must be constitutional; and such a condition, contrary to what Justice
Holmes might say, is not rendered constitutional simply by reason of
its being a lesser restriction imposed on a greater benefit. Therefore,
it was indispensable to the Court's reasoning that Abood created
constitutional precedent in favor of the union nonmembers,
establishing for them a First Amendment right to direct agency-fee
use. The Court could hang the greater-includes-the-lesser argument
on the Abood peg because the Abood rationale presented a
compelling nonmember interest that justified the Court's reasoning
that the union did not have a constitutional right to agency fees.
Without Abood, the Court would have been faced with adjudicating a
restriction upon the WEA's use of money legally collected and spent
for political purposes with no other constitutional considerations to
temper the propriety of such a restriction. Although the Holmesian
analysis would find no difficulty imposing the § 760 restriction with
little regard for the higher constitutionality of it, the modem Court
needed another constitutional right to counter the union's assertions
and to make sure that the limitation of § 760 was, itself,
constitutional in substance.
There is yet another example of throwback reasoning in
Davenport, one arising especially from the administrative law field.
Before the Goldberg257 watershed, many state entitlements counted
only as "privileges," 258 with no property interest attaching. The
Court has abrogated the privilege doctrine over time in the context of
important due-process cases, finding the hallmarks of property rights
in such government-granted benefits as welfare checks. 25 9 Rights
257. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254.
258. See, e.g., Smith v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 169 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 1969)
(holding that the revocation of petitioner's liquor license without notice or
opportunity for hearing did not violate a constitutional right to due process because
a license to sell alcohol granted by the state was not a property right but a privilege
subject to the statute under which it is taken and the provisions thereof, including
the inopportunity to complain).
259. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254; see also Brookpark Entm't, Inc. v. Taft,
951 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a state liquor license could not be
revoked without notice and opportunity to be heard because the licensee had "a
property interest," which entitled him to due process, and which prevented his
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adhering to those individual interests provided through government
programs triggered due-process concerns in the face of arbitrary
deprivations of such property. Today, for instance, a social security
beneficiary possesses extensive due process rights based on thirty-
plus years of Court precedent, whereas earlier cases, pre-Goldberg,
afforded more leeway to the government to revoke benefits positively
conferred and provided far less opportunity to the claimant to
challenge the revocation.2 60 The WEA did not sue on due-process
grounds because it enjoyed the opportunity to be heard in state court
on its constitutional claims. But the principle by which the Supreme
Court of the United States resisted the union's call to strike down §
760 skirted the edges of the privilege doctrine by allowing for
substantial deference to Washington's judgment that a condition
should be placed on the use of a state-granted benefit.
For example, when the WEA argued for recognition of its interest
in agency fees already in its possession, the Court disavowed that
argument as "immaterial., 261 Again, only through the mechanisms
of Washington law did those funds arrive at the WEA's coffers.
Consequently, the state-granted nature of the "privilege" of collecting
agency fees accorded no absolute possessory right to the use of those
fees, even though the Court's past administrative law due-process
jurisprudence might have suggested that some greater property
interest attached to that money. Agency fees, though a tax on
nonmembers, were essentially a government benefit to the union, yet
the Court limited the union's interest in those fees and tethered it to
compliance with § 760.
license from being revoked through referendum); Bd. of Regents of State Colleges
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Certain attributes of "property" interests protected by procedural due
process emerge .... To have a property interest in a benefit, a person
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the
ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people
rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.
It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an
opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.
Id. at 577.
260. See, e.g., Liquor Control Comm 'n, 169 N.W.2d 803.
261. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380.
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The Court did not entirely revive the classic Holmesian
constitutional conditioning or the privilege doctrine, but the
Davenport logic does build on older methods of interpretation. This
indicates a curious backswing toward the recognition of a state's
prerogative to craft extraordinary benefit systems subject to
conditions, deference to the state as the life-giver of the system, and
the understanding that limitations and restrictions of a "modest
262
degree might be proper for the simple reason that the state could
permissibly choose to go further. As the distributor of special
benefits and privileges, the state remains the master of its own
dealings. Fortunately, in Davenport, this meant that the Court settled
firmly on the side of individual rights and a fortiori protection of
nonmembers from the forced misuse of their own money for political
purposes they did not support.
The Court marked the distinction of member dues and agency
fees by distinguishing the means of acquisition, i.e., forced and
involuntary contribution. 263 Agency fees came to the union through
state-sanctioned coercion not volunteerism, and that difference led to
the "new rule" taken from Davenport for application in future cases.
It had already been settled in Buckley that the right to spend money
for political purposes did not exist in an absolute sense when other
compelling state interests had to be considered. 264  Davenport
decreed one limiting factor that will affect unions in states that
operate agency-fee systems: States can prohibit the use of money for
political speech if such money was acquired through the
extraordinary grant of power to collect it from individuals who are
forced by law to pay. The First Amendment right of the compelled
contributors to direct the use of their money prevails vis-A-vis the
collecting entity's right to spend that money willingly, if the state
says so.
A final point on the importance of the Court's decision-making
process should be offered. Though there is little overt proof in the
text of the Davenport opinion, reading between the lines suggests
that a specific equitable principle motivated the court's angle of
262. Id. at 2378.
263. See id. at 2380. The most obvious instance of the Court distinguishing on
the basis of acquisition came in Part I-B, where the Court disposed of the WEA's
campaign finance argument. See id.
264. See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
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attack on the issue of the WEA's collection of the agency fees, and
the union's argument that the money belonged to it. Justice Scalia's
outright rejection of the notion of union ownership with the phrase
"other people's money" '265 betrays the Court's propensity to view the
collection of agency fees, though legal, as unjust enrichment of the
union to the detriment of the nonmembers. A fruitful unjust
enrichment claim of a plaintiff generally requires the defendant to
disgorge the benefit gained at the plaintiffs expense for reasons of
fundamental fairness, even in the absence of a contractual
relationship. In Davenport, the Court did not force the WEA to
return the money to the nonmembers. The citizens of Washington
had simply conditioned the use of those fees, and the Court would
not label the whole system unconstitutional or inequitable where the
narrower remedy of upholding a limitation on the fees gained
"unjustly" would suffice to vindicate the rights of those teachers from
whom the fees were excised.
Yet, if the system was unfair in its core principle, the Court
should have taken a stronger position against the practice of agency-
fee arrangements in state-employee labor law. It is beyond the scope
of this Note to offer reasons for the Court's refusal to strike down the
whole system-reasons which may have more to do with Court
administration or other principles of law not here elucidated.
However, the dissatisfaction manifested by the actual victors of the
case in response to the holding suggests there was much more to be
desired of the opinion, namely, a firm repudiation of the inveterate
agency-fee system that ignores the right of teachers to make an
honest living without paying a tax to support a labor union's political
activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
Davenport is a case that can easily avoid attention. When
stripped to its basics, the question is minor and procedural: Must
schoolteachers who do not want their money used for union political
activities object to that practice, or can they stop it by withholding
permission?
265. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2380.
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But the paramount issue here does not deal in banal legalese. The
power of the WEA to collect agency fees is the very same as that
Alexander Hamilton called, "an indispensable ingredient in every
constitution" 266-the power of the state to tax. Here, the authority of
the WEA is not contractual, like between parties to an agreement; but
rather the sovereignty of government apportioned to a private entity,
not for the benefit of the common good, but for the personal
advantage of the delegate. And it was this nature of taxation that
sealed the case in favor of the teachers.
The Court needed to say that agency fees were properly
nonmembers' money unless the union complied with conditions
limiting its use. If nothing else, Davenport accomplished that goal,
and continues to serve as recognition of the important individual right
to speak politically through money, or in the case of the WEA
nonmembers, to choose not to speak through channels the individual
deems unfit.
The WEA still enjoys the extraordinary benefit of collecting
agency fees because the politicians in Washington have chosen to
foster the system. One wonders what actual benefit the WEA
provides to teachers when it has no incentive to retain membership
through satisfactory performance. After all, leaving the union
triggers a state-authorized penalty for the individual who does so.
Why the expenditure of that tax for the union's political work does
not bother the state legislature is speculative, but it certainly bothered
the Court.
266. HAMILTON, ET AL., THE FEDERALIST 156 (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
